Contents
This case is part of the Chmltech Business case series. It is written for discussion, in the style of a business school teaching case: it stops at the decision and leaves the outcome to a closed section at the end, so you can decide first. The decision belongs to Tobi Lütke, Shopify's co-founder and chief executive, in early 2023. It is drawn from public reporting and company statements listed under Sources; it is not based on interviews or private documents.
The decision
By early 2023 Shopify had spent four years and billions of dollars trying to give its merchants what Amazon gave its sellers: fast, reliable delivery from a shared network of warehouses. It had bought a warehouse robotics company and a fast-growing logistics start-up, and it was running its own fulfilment centres. The network was starting to work. It was also consuming cash and management attention at a time when growth across e-commerce had slowed and investors had turned against loss-making expansion.
Tobi Lütke had to decide whether logistics was part of Shopify's core business or a distraction from it. Keep investing, and Shopify might one day offer merchants a real alternative to Fulfillment by Amazon. Pull back, and it could return to the software platform that had made it one of Canada's most valuable companies.
Company background
Lütke founded Shopify in Ottawa in 2006 after building an online store for his own snowboard shop and finding the available software poor. Shopify sells merchants the tools to run an online store, and later point-of-sale, payments, shipping labels and marketing. It makes money from subscriptions and from a share of payments and other services. By 2019 it powered more than 800,000 businesses in about 175 countries.
Shopify positioned itself as the arms dealer to the rebels: the platform that let independent brands sell directly to customers instead of depending on Amazon's marketplace. That made Amazon's delivery promise a direct competitive threat. Shoppers had come to expect two-day delivery, and merchants on Shopify had to arrange it themselves through third-party logistics providers of varying quality.
The situation in early 2023
Exhibit 1. Shopify's logistics build-out
| Date | Step |
|---|---|
| June 2019 | Shopify Fulfillment Network announced, with about $1 billion budgeted over five years for U.S. fulfilment centres |
| September 2019 | Agrees to buy 6 River Systems, maker of the "Chuck" warehouse robot, for about $450 million (60% cash, 40% shares) |
| 2020–2021 | Pandemic lifts e-commerce sharply; Shopify's revenue and share price soar |
| February 2022 | Shifts the network to fewer, larger warehouses that Shopify will run itself |
| May 2022 | Agrees to buy Deliverr, a fulfilment start-up, for about $2.1 billion, its largest acquisition |
| July 2022 | Lays off about 10% of staff; Lütke says he bet wrong that the pandemic's shift to online shopping would last |
| Early 2023 | E-commerce growth normalises; investors reward profit over expansion |
The strategic case for logistics was real. Delivery speed affects conversion, and merchants wanted one partner for software and fulfilment. Amazon had shown that owning the warehouses could become a lasting advantage. The case against was also real. Warehouses are a business of capital, labour and thin margins, very different from software. Building a network dense enough to promise fast delivery across North America would take many more years and billions more dollars, and Amazon, the competitor to beat, was spending tens of billions a year on the same thing.
Exhibit 3. Software and logistics compared
| Feature | Shopify's software business | A fulfilment network |
|---|---|---|
| Capital needed | Low; mostly people | High; buildings, equipment, inventory systems |
| Cost of serving one more merchant | Close to zero | Rises with every order shipped |
| Typical margin | High | Thin |
| Main management skill | Product and engineering | Operations, labour, real estate |
| Scale needed to compete | Already achieved | Years away |
The options
Option A: Keep building
Stay the course with the owned network, integrate Deliverr fully and accept several more years of losses in logistics to match Amazon's delivery promise.
Option B: Narrow the network
Keep the software that routes orders and promises delivery dates, but run only a few warehouses in the largest markets and lean on partners elsewhere.
Option C: Sell the operation to a logistics specialist and partner with it
Hand the warehouses and staff to a company whose core business is logistics, keep a stake and a preferred-partner agreement, and return to software.
Option D: Close it down
Shut the warehouses and leave merchants to choose their own providers, writing off the investment.
Discussion questions
- What is Shopify's core business? Does owning warehouses strengthen it or compete with it for money and attention?
- Use Exhibit 3. Why might a company that is excellent at software struggle in logistics, even with the same people at the top?
- How should Lütke weigh the money already spent? What should the $2.1 billion paid for Deliverr count for in this decision?
- If Shopify exits, how does it still answer merchants who need fast delivery to compete with Amazon?
- What would have had to be true in 2023 for Option A to be the right choice?
What happened next
Decide what you would do before you open this section.
Show what the company did and how it turned out
Lütke chose to sell. On May 4, 2023, Shopify announced that it would sell its logistics business, including Deliverr, to Flexport, a freight forwarding company, in an all-stock deal that gave Shopify about a 13% stake in Flexport (and a stake in the high teens in total) plus a board seat. Flexport became Shopify's preferred logistics partner. 6 River Systems was sold separately to Ocado Group. Shopify cut about 20% of its workforce, more than 2,000 people, its second large round of layoffs in a year, and recorded an impairment charge of about $1.5 billion on the logistics business.
In his letter to staff, Lütke called logistics a "side quest" and said Shopify's main mission was to make commerce simpler and more widely accessible. The same day, Shopify reported first-quarter revenue of $1.51 billion, up 25%, ahead of forecasts. Its shares rose about 23% that day.
Over the following years Shopify concentrated on software, payments and its merchant tools, and returned to steady profitability. The decision is now widely cited as an example of a company admitting that an expensive strategy no longer fit, and exiting before it consumed more.
Lessons for small and mid-sized businesses
Be clear about what your core business is. Every company is tempted to own more of the chain. Ask whether the new activity uses the same skills and economics as the business you are good at. For many SMEs, logistics, IT hosting or in-house manufacturing are better bought from a specialist, as the growth of third-party logistics providers shows.
Money already spent should not decide the next step. The $2.1 billion was gone whichever option Shopify chose. The only question was whether the next dollar would earn more in logistics or in software.
A partnership can deliver the customer benefit without the ownership. Shopify kept a stake and a preferred partner, so merchants still had an answer on delivery.
Set exit criteria when you start. Decide in advance what results, by what date, would make you stop. It makes a hard decision easier to take on time.
Sources
- Shopify press release, "Shopify to Acquire 6 River Systems" (September 9, 2019)
- Digital Commerce 360, Shopify's $1 billion fulfilment network plan and the 6 River deal (2019)
- The Logic, "Shopify unloads logistics business as it cuts 20% of workforce" (May 4, 2023)
- FreightWaves, "Shopify sells fulfillment business to Flexport, slashes 20% of staff" (2023)
- CBC News, "Shopify to lay off 20% of staff" (impairment charge)
- Yahoo Finance Canada, what to know about Shopify's layoffs ("side quest" letter, share price)
- Business Insider, Shopify sale of 6 River Systems to Ocado
More cases
- Costco Case Study: 4,000 Products and a Capped Markup
- Amazon Prime Case Study: Betting on Free Two-Day Shipping
- Apple Case Study: From Months of Inventory to Days
- Starbucks Case Study: Closing Every Store for an Afternoon
- Toyota Case Study: How Lean Is Too Lean?
- Lululemon Case Study: The 2013 Yoga Pants Recall
- Netflix Case Study: Splitting DVD from Streaming
- Tesla Case Study: A Cheaper Car or a Robotaxi?
